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Mayer and Stix: The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees

THE PREVAILING PARTY SHOULD
RECOVER COUNSEL FEES*
MICHAEL F. MAYERt AND WAYNE STIXt

INTRODUCTION

T

HE TIME HAS COME when our judicial system should make compensation to the prevailing party for expenses incurred in litigation a
meaningful right, as opposed to a valueless gesture. In brief, this means
that in the bulk of civil cases a successful party should no longer have to
bear the full burden of his own counsel fees, and conversely those who
take to our courts in vain should no longer be permitted to avoid the
justice of substantial participation in the costs they have occasioned. To
do this requires considerable alteration of the present cost structure applied
by our rules as well as a change in our philosophy of compensation for loss.
It has, of course, long been theorized that the essential element of
our damage rules is to make the injured party "whole." No party in a
breach of contract situation, for example, should be left following the
breach with less in hand than he would have had if his adversary had lived
up to his bargain. -But realistically speaking, this is precisely what happens
under the present cost and damage structure when litigation occurs.
I recently won a modest recovery for an abused client who had
rendered services without being compensated. Alas, after collection of a
full judgment for him with interest and costs, as presently defined, the
total recovery was less than a fair and appropriate statement for services
rendered. Has this client been made "whole" for the losses he suffered?
Has the judicial machinery treated him with even elementary fairness? I
submit that it is self-evident that it has not.
It is not recovering plaintiffs alone who suffer fantastic losses.
Consider the party unjustly sued, whose contentions ultimately prevail in
the judicial test. Does the system make him "whole"? The answer to this
rhetorical question is again, "no." Except in the rarest instance, no counsel
fee can be recovered, not even the slightest part of it. Not only has this
defendant been unjustly required to waste time in litigation, but he must
also bear his own counsel -fee and numerous other costs uncompensated
*Portions of this article appear in Mayer, Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel
Fees, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 29, 1971.
f B.S., Harvard University; L.L.B., Yale University; partner in Mayer & Bucher of
New York, N.Y.; author of WHAT You SHOULD KNOW ABOUT LIBEL AND SLANDER
(1968), RIGHTS OF PRIVACY (1972), THE FILM INDUSTRIEs-PRACTICAL BUSINESS,
LEGAL PROBLEMS IN PRODUCTION, DISTRmIBUTION AND EXHmIBITION (1973), and numer-

ous articles in legal periodicals.
* J.D., New York Law School; currently practicing in White Plains, New York, and
L.L.M. candidate at New York University School of Law.
[4261

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1975

1

Akron Law Review, Vol. 8 [1975], Iss. 3, Art. 4

Spring, 1975]

THE PRAMELINo PARTY SHOULD REcovn CouNsEL FE3S

427

for by an obsolete system of awards that covers only a small fraction
of his out-of-pocket expense.
While the transfer of the cost burden to the unsuccessful litigant is
basically desirable because it compensates the innocent party, as a system
of justice should, it also has an added advantage. Our inundated judicial
machinery needs some relief from clogged courts and calendars.
Is it not likely that windfall-minded claimants lacking a true cause of
action, but anxious for a "strike" settlement, will be a little less anxious
to enter our courts if they knew that at the end of the judicial road a
sizable judgment for costs, including all or a substantial part of an
opponent's legal fees would be waiting for them? Or, in the matter of less
doubtful claims, is not settlement or fair adjustment far more likely when
each side knows there are real and substantial risks in defeat and not
just the danger of minimal costs? Under such circumstances, dubious
plaintiffs should prove less anxious to sue and intransigent defendants
more prone to settle. If for no other reasons than these, judicial
housekeeping requires a new attitude toward costs.'
COST STRUCTURE, PAST AND PRESENT

The ancient rule of minimal costs would appear to be based at least
partially on historical factors. Despite an early tendency to follow English
practice in the colonial period, there were fears in America that the court
system would be operated contrary to the interests of the common man.
To grant legal fees as costs might, some thought, discourage the poor
man's use of the court machinery. There was also the fear that wealthy
landed interests might dominate the law and that somehow or other a
grant of legal fees could perpetuate that power. These fears have vanished
with the years, but not the policies that accompanied them.
In the formative years of this country the total population of
3,929,214 people 2 lived mainly on farms. Legal disputes were few, usually
over land boundaries. The courts were discovering the law rather than
interpreting it. Poor or rich, a litigant could go before a court himself and
achieve the same verdict as that gained by a lawyer representing him. The
founding fathers, realizing this, stamped the American attorney a luxury.
Frowning on extravagance and fearing the result of high court costs,
America broke judicially from the English tradition of allowing legal fees
as costs to the prevailing party.

1A

look at the New York statute is revealing. Assume that one can locate the
appropriate provisions specified in the Civil Practice Law & Rules, and that a grant of
costs would not be inequitable "under all the circumstances." The prevailing party may
then recover $25 before note of issue; after note of issue, $50, and following trial or
inquest, $75. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 8101, 8201 (McKinney 1974). Counsel fees, except
in the extraordinary case, remain uncompensated. See notes 73-75, infra, and
accompanying text.
2Official 1790 total United States population, United States Official Census, U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
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The public policy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries dictated
that Americans take their disputes to court. The theory was twofold. By
so doing, the litigants would have their issue decided in a fair and
compulsory manner and American jurisprudence would be advanced by
increased exposure. America was a noble experiment. For the first time
in recorded history the poor and common 3man could seek the protection
of a tribunal of justice on a universal scale.
As American jurisprudence matured, the noble experiment continued
with the same public policy dictates and procedures as set down in
1776. Concurrently, population exploded, cities grew, the industrial
revolution shook the Jeffersonian Utopia to bits, and the problems of
the citizenry changed.
Today, we still do not allow attorney fees as part of court costs. The
4
American population has grown to 205,614,000, mostly living in urban
areas. This phenomenon has resulted in substantial overloading of the
court calendars with pending suits. Instead of speaking in terms of trial
by jury, we think in terms of revolving door justice and plea bargaining.
In an attempt to alleviate the procedural problems and the abuse of the
judicial system, jurists idealistically ask that disputants settle their
5
differences without the aid of the courts. But still thousands of suits are
and
with no legal issue. As the abuse
merit,
brought with doubtful intent,
continues the common man of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries has
become the poor urban dweller of the twentieth century, a man who is
barred from litigating his problems because of high legal costs and an
antiquated system. His wrong cannot be made right. Paradoxically, the
reason for the procedural breakdown of our courts and the exclusion of a
large percentage of the population is that we are trying to help the poor
and the judicial problems of today with 200-year-old methodology.
It is time for the judicial fraternity and lawmakers to admit to the
reality that attorneys are no longer an embellishment in the nation's
courtrooms. Our laws are vast and complex. A layman must seek
legal advice to guide him through the maze of legal procedure and
substance of all litigations.
The present cost structure is geared to support large damage litigation
to the exclusion of small claims of the poor and common man. It does not
necessarily follow, however, that small dollar claims represent small legal
and humanitarian issues, and that high dollar actions represent complex
and worthy questions. 6 The unfortunate consequence of this situation is
3 See generally Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation? 49 IowA
L. REv. 75 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Kuenzel].
4
Official 1970 total United States population, United States Official Census, U.S.
Bureau of the Census.
5 See, e.g., White v. Flood, 258 Iowa 402, 409, 138 N.W.2d 863, 867 (1965); Bakke
v. Bakke, 242 Iowa 612, 618, 47 N.W.2d 813, 817 (1951).
6
Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 84.
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as obvious as it is socially unjust and dangerous. The legal problems of the
common citizen are often complex and personally humiliating, but
monetarily too insignificant to have a judicial remedy. The result often is
frustration, alienation from society, and desperation. A victim of such
a plight frequently becomes the violator in search of revenge. And so
the cycle makes another turn; crime rates and the number of civil
rights infringements rise.
The entire difficulty with our present but antiquated cost structure is
simply that it fails to make the injured party "whole." For example, in a
negligence action an attorney will work on a basis of a one-third contingent
fee. 7 If he prevails his client will be made two-thirds "whole" and
it is quite possible that the attorney has earned only a percentage of
the reasonable value of his services.
There are many similar situations of injustice. The court will award
only nominal damages for violations to civil rights, reputation, and for
assaults and batteries not accompanied by bodily injury or financial
loss. The legal fee remains high. The victim prevails in name only; he
still must suffer financial injuries and the cost of securing his civil rights
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. 8 The poor man who is most
susceptible to this type of injustice cannot afford to win.
The conclusion can be but one: In our noble attempt to keep the
doors of justice open to all, in our desire to make the court machinery
effective, we have accomplished the opposite by clinging to an agrarian
solution to a now urban problem. Why do we refuse to recognize that this
procedure is not only unadaptable to modern problems, but also it is acting
as its own catalyst in advancing those very evils that we try to prevent.
THE ENGLISH SYSTEM OF COSTS

9

The obvious and simplest remedy for curing the overcrowding of our
courts, while at the same time opening the doors of justice to all citizens, is
to rejoin England in the policy of awarding reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party as part of court costs.
Allowing attorney fees as part of costs would join reality and theory
by making the injured party "whole." It would alleviate the situation
where an attorney working on a contingent basis must accept less than his
reasonable value. The court calendar would not be as populous with the
disappearance of strike actions and groundless claims of would-be
plaintiffs who now bring actions with no chance of winning. This legal
blackmail which forces the defendant to settle for an amount that is not
7 This is true only if the prognosis for a recovery is at least large enough to cover his
costs. Obviously this does not help the indigent person.
8 Kuenzel, supra note 4, at 84.
9 For an American comparative view, see Greenberger, Appellate Review in England
and the United States--Who Bears the Ultimate Burden? 1 DUQ. U.L. Rav. 161 (1963).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol8/iss3/4

4

Mayer and Stix: The Prevailing Party Should Recover Counsel Fees

AxRON LAW REvmw

[Vol. 8:3

justly owing the plaintiff would be unable to achieve its economic goal. A
defendant would not be able to force a prevailing plaintiff into time-wasting
litigation by groundless appeals.
In other words, with attorney fees awarded to the prevailing party,
legal blackmail and the necessity to balance the cost of settlement against
the expense of litigation will cease to be a potent tool to prevent justice. 10
In England the court has the discretionary authority to award counsel
fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. This has been the rule for
hundreds of years. The English system of court costs was not planned
or designed to prevent misuse and abuse of the judicial system and is not
directed toward such ends today. The beneficial effect that this cost system
has on limiting the court congestion, holding down costs and discouraging
nonmeritorious suits has contributed to the efficiency and quality of
British justice and should continue to do so in the future."
In the face of this fact it is noteworthy that their judicial manpower
has remained comparatively stable for ninety years [as of 1964],
despite the fact that the total population of England and Wales
has increased from 22.7 million people to 43.5 million during
the period in question. 2
The cost system was designed and is used for the purpose of making
an injured party "whole." In 1858 Lord Cranworth expounded the
underlying philosophy: "I think that the general principle upon the subject
of cost is, and ought to be ... that the cost ought never to be considered as
a penalty or punishment, but merely a necessary consequence of a party
' 13
having created a litigation in which he has failed."
After successful litigation, barristers and solicitors submit a document
of cost items into court. Either the unsuccessful adversary consents to pay
these enumerated costs or if a dispute develops a special taxing master
makes a determination of what items and amounts are necessary,
reasonable and proper. "Moreover, if the tortfeasor or contract breaker
refuses to honor the legitimate demands of the ultimately successful party
and forces the latter to resort to litigation, he is considered to have
14
increased the damages inflicted.'
Under the English rules the trial judge has the discretion to deny
costs, or even award them to a losing party in a case (as happens) where

10 Kuenzel, supra note 4,

at 79.
11 Greenberger, The Cost of Justice: An American Problem, An English Solution,
9 VILL. L. Rnv. 400, 401 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Greenberger].
12 Id. at 400-01. The ratio of Queen's Bench Division Judges per million in population
has increased from 1 to 1.26, to 1 to 2.18. INrTIAL REPORT OF THE CoMMrrrEE ON
SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, CMD. No. 7764, Appendix C, p. 59.
13 Clark v. Hart, 6 H.L.C. 633, 667, 10 Eng. Rep. 1443, 1457 (1858).

14 Greenberger, supranote 12, at 401.
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the "loser" has really won or the successful suit is unjustified. In other
unusual circumstances, fees may be denied or even charged to the
prevailing party where, for example, a plaintiff refuses a fair settlement
offer and recovers less after trial.'5
The taxing master allows only necessary and reasonable costs that
were directly incurred preparing and attaining justice. Allowance is not
permitted for money spent by maintaining an overcautious position, or
for a mistake which results in excessive court time, or extravagant
or special charges of a witness. 16 A person who abuses the system and
increases the cost of litigation above the essential cost does so at the risk of
having to pay the burden of the entire cost or that portion which the court
considers excessive. The thrifty English litigant rarely abuses the system.'7
Even with the cost control legislation and three methods of
determining the reasonable attorney fee,' 8 the court has awarded generous
allowances. In Graigola Merthyr Co. v. Swansea Corp.,' the court
awarded the prevailing defendant $350,000. The high absolute dollar
awards, however, serve to keep the teeth of the legislation sharp. Would-be
abusers know that it will be unprofitable to bring an unjustified suit and

persons with legitimate claims, even for small dollar amounts, can proceed
assured that the contract-breaker or tortfeasor will pay the costs.
The American dream of equal justice for all exists in England. By
incorporating into our state and federal statutes similar legislation allowing
reasonable attorney fees for the prevailing party in the discretion of the
court we can -bring that dream to America and merge reality with theory.

15 For an excellent discussion of the exception to the rule of allowing attorney fees as
court costs to prevailing party, see Greenberger, supra note 12.
16 Supreme Court of Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925, 15 & 16 Geo.5, c. 43, § 50.
17 See Smith v. Buller, L.R. 19 Eq. 473, 475 (1875).
18 The Evershed Report Committee on SUPREME COURT PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE,
FINAL REPORT, CsD. No. 8878, § 720-72 (1954), recommended three taxing methods:

"party and party" taxation, "common fund" taxation, and "solicitor and own client"
taxation.
''Party and Party taxation" is the most common method. The costs to litigate the
suit are kept to a reasonable minimum. The procedure is controlled by a taxing
master, who is similar to a referee in a bankruptcy proceeding, who determines what
costs are necessary and reasonable to achieve justice.
"Common Fund Standard" method is a rich man's "Party and Party." Under
this liberalized cost method fees and charges that would be ruled excessive under the
"Party and Party" taxation are allowed, and certain items that would be stricken as
luxuries are acceptable to the taxing master. This method of taxing is allowed only
under special circumstances. The "Solicitor and Own Client" taxation method is
comparable to the present American system. The lawyer and client determine the fee;
however, to prevent abuse, the court and taxing master reserve the power to rule on
the propriety of the fee.
See 30 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND, pt. 2, § 6 (3d ed. 1959), for complete

discussion and related case application.
19 45 T.L.R 219 (K.B. 1929).
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THE FEDERAL STATUTES

Copyright
20
Under the Federal Copyright Law, reasonable attorney fees are
21
permitted in the court's discretion. "In all actions, suits, or proceedings
under this title, except when brought by or against the United States or
any officer thereof, full costs shall be allowed, and the court may award
22
to the prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs."
The effect of this section, which allows the court to award reasonable
attorney's fee to the prevailing party, has acted as an incentive for those
who have valid claims of copyright infringement to seek the aid of the
judicial machinery. It has not justified the fears and predictions of
the opponents of such a proviso that the courts will become the private
domain of the rich, that the poor will be discouraged from seeking the
court's protection, and that legitimate claims will go unredressed. In fact
the opposite conclusion would seem more valid.
The courts have advanced several predominant theories in copyright
cases favoring the awarding of counsel fees as part of court costs. The
most prevalent of these theories is to make the winning party "whole."
The explanation basically is that the losing party to an action, be it the
plaintiff or the defendant, must bear the burden of paying the opponent's
counsel fees as a direct and proximate result of his infringement of the
plaintiff's copyright. Or, if defendant prevails, the proximate result is
the securing to the defendant of full use and enjoyment of the profits
and benefits of his creative work unmolested by others.
The classes of situations that fit in this discretionary category
are based on some moral wrong in instituting the action. One such23
target is the deliberate copyright infringer, such as in Stein v. Rosenthal.
In this case the
...defendants unconscionably invaded plaintiffs' copyright and in
their solicitation of customers for their infringing merchandise,
harassed the plaintiffs' customers and resorted to such devices as
impersonation of federal agents in an attempt to gain a view of the
tradesmen's records of business with plaintiffs. Where the techniques
20 Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1947).
21 Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Jobela Fabrics, Inc., 329 F.2d 194 (2d Cir. 1964); Orgel

v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962); Leo Feist, Inc., v. Apollo

Records N.Y. Corp., 300 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd 418 F.2d 1249 (2d Cir.
1969); Breffort v. I Had a Ball Co., 271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); C. S.
Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc., 210 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y.
1962); Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Jerome v. Twentieth
Century Fox Film Corp., 71 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).
2
2Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 116 (1947) (emphasis added).
23 103 F. Supp. 227 (S.D. Cal. 1952). See Leo Feist, Inc. v. Apollo Records, N.Y.
Corp., 300 F. Supp. 32 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Johnson v. Maryland, 283 F. Supp. 929
(D.C. Md. 1968). See also C. S. Hammond & Co. v. International College Globe, Inc.,
210 F. Supp. 206 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
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of copying and vending infringing articles are so tinged with bad
faith, plaintiffs are entitled to reasonable attorney's fees...24
The court's discretionary wrath in copyright cases is also turned toward
the plaintiff who institutes an action in bad faith merely to vex and harass
the defendant, where the claim is so lacking in merit that it is unreasonable. Such was the case in Cloth v. Hyman,25 where the court said that
[a]n attorney's fee is properly awarded when the infringement action
has been commenced in bad faith, as where the evidence establishes
that the plaintiff's real motive is to vex and harass the defendant or
where plaintiff's claim is so lacking in merit as to present no
arguable question of law or genuine issue of fact.28
In the actions where counsel fees were awarded there has been an
element of bad faith. In these cases the award was used as a penalty
as well as compensation to the prevailing party. Bad faith is an element
weighted heavily by the court when exercising its "discretion."
The fact that counsel fees are awarded as a penalty in some cases is
blatant, such as, where the prevailing party is disallowed counsel costs
because of bad faith on his part. In United Artists Television, Inc. v.
Fortnightly Corp.,2 the prevailing defendant was denied $40,000 attorney
fees, because the court felt that such awards are to be made only for
"penalization" of the losing party. In Jerome v. Twentieth Century Fox
Film Corp.,28 the prevailing defendant's application for $30,000 attorney
fees was disallowed, to penalize him for his over-technical attitude which
forced plaintiff to unnecessary litigation and expense.
The courts have also disallowed attorney fees where the question
litigated is unique, novel, complex and of a genuine issue accompanied by
no moral guilt or blame. An excellent discussion concerning this subject is
Judge Feinberg's decision in Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.'s
In Breffort v. I Had A Ball Co.,30 the court summed up the theory
that reasonable attorney fees are awarded to the prevailing defendant to
deter copyright infringement by making it more expensive to do so and
to shift the burden of protecting the copyright property to the infringer.
The theory for awarding a successful defendant reasonable attorney fees
is to impose a penalty upon the plaintiff for instituting a "baseless,
s
frivolous, or unreasonable suit, or one instituted in bad faith."'
24103 F. Supp. at 231-32.
25146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956). See Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 131 F. Supp. 165
(D.C.Cal. 1955).
26 146 F. Supp. at 193.
27300 F. Supp. 1005 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
28 71 F. Supp. 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1946).

29 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
30271 F. Supp. 623 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).

31 id.at 627.
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The Copyright Act 3 2 makes it possible for individuals, groups and
corporations to bring action in the courts to defend their rights to exclusive
use of their creative property from infringers regardless of the size of
damages to be expected. Unlike other areas of law where reasonable
33
attorney fees are expressly denied as part of the costs, parties involved
in this branch of law can bring actions for even a small, but frustrating,
infringement because they can be made "whole." It also prevents claims
that are intended to harass and blackmail on groundless allegations.
There is no reason why such a rule should not be established to apply
uniformly to other branches of civil law. The doors to the judicial
machinery will then be reopened to the monetarily weaker litigant who
will find relief for his injuries suffered, although compensatory damages
are small and legal fees high.
Section 1'16 of the Copyright Act does not authorize or speak to the
4
allowance of the actual attorney fee, but to a "reasonable" attorney fee.3
Apparently the difference between an actual allowance and a reasonable
allowance escapes the detection of critics, accounting for the fears of such
an award. Allowing reasonable attorney fees would not inflate actual
fees because any extravagance, waste or excessiveness would not be
compensated for in the court's awarding of attorney fees. Costs which
increase the prevailing party's legal fee will be his own responsibility.
Abuse of the system could only be self-defeating.
In most cases, the court has been generous in awarding counsel
fees. The allowances are often large, both in absolute dollar amount
and also in percentage of damages awarded. In rare instances the
court has allowed attorney fees even to the extent of 100% of damages,
35
where the award was modest.
Once the court has decided to award a reasonable counsel fee, it
next applies a second test to determine the dollar amount. Most courts
follow -the same test of relevant factors, but each court considers certain
individual elements more important than others.
The elements most commonly considered important in determining
36
the dollar amount of attorney fees are amount of work necessary,

32

17 U.S.C. 116 (1947).

E.g., N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. § 8304.4 (McKinney 1974).
34 See 2 NIMM:RR, NImmER ON COPYRIGHT § 161 (1974).
35
In M. Witmark & Sons v. Calloway, 22 F.2d 412 (E.D. Tenn. 1927), damages

33

awarded were $250 and counsel fees were $250.

36 In determining what is a reasonable attorney's fee, the court considered amount of
work necessary, the amount of work done, the skill employed, the monetary amount
involved, and the result achieved. Cloth v. Hyman, 146 F. Supp. 185 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
See afso Orgel v. Clark Boardman Co., 301 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1962); In Re
Continental Vending Machine Corp., 318 F. Supp. 421 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
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amount of work done, 37 amount of skill employed,38 amount of damages
4
4

involved, 39 result achieved, 40 distance traveled, ' amount of time involved,
and the attorney's professional standing and reputation. 43 It should be
emphasized that actual attorney's fee is irrelevant in the determination.
The actual dollar awards have been large, both in absolute amount
and percentage of damages awarded. In Davis v. E. 1. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 44 for example, the counsel fee of $15,000 was 60%
45
of the $25,000 damages awarded.
Antitrust

The Federal Antitrust Law states that "any person who shall be injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust
laws may sue therefore,... and shall recover threefold the damages by him
sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."'
The purpose of this statute is to put teeth into antitrust regulations as
they affect private individuals and corporations. Although recovery of the
reasonable attorney's fee is awarded only to the prevailing plaintiff in a
3

7See cases cited note 36 supra. In Cohan v. Richmond, 86 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1936),
the attorney for the plaintiff submitted a brief of only seven pages with only 10 or 12
citations. The court felt that this showed little effort, work or ingenuity. The attorney's
fee was, therefore, limited to $400.
38
The case is in some respects novel and was difficult and extraordinary, requiring
careful, extended and painstaking preparation, original investigation and exploration of a subject in certain aspects with few landmarks for guidance.... Upon
the motion for costs, plaintiff's counsel sets up a detailed statement of services
rendered and indicates that if he were reasonably compensated by his client
there would be nothing left out of the award.
Cory v. Physical Culture Hotel, 14 F. Supp. 986 (W.D.N.Y. 1936). "In the case at
bar, while a substantial amount of time was spent by plaintiffs' counsel, much of it
was necessitated by counsel's unfamiliarity with the field." Orgel v. Clark Boardman
Co., 301 F.2d 119, 122 (2d Cir. 1962). As a result, the attorney's fee was reduced
from $10,000 to $5,000.
39
See cases cited note 36 supra. See also Burnett v. Lambino, 206 F. Supp. 517
(S.D.N.Y. 1962), wherein the court stated: "In fixing these amounts I have considered
the time necessarily spent by defendants' attorneys in thorough trial preparation...
skill demonstrated by defendants' attorneys, their professional standing and reputation,
and the monetary amount potentially involved [$9,000,000]." 206 F. Supp. at 519.
4
o See cases cited note 36 supra.
41 In Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 106 F.2d 45, 55 (2d Cir. 1939), the
court considered the extremely large amount of work done, the long and intricate
computation, the fact that the plaintiff made a trip to California, and that the case
had been pending for seven years.
42
See cases cited notes 38, 41 supra. In determining the counsel fees for the prevailing plaintiff, the court considered the lawyers' high degree of skill and the "amount of
work they did during more than six years which was considerable, occupying over
2,000 hours of partners' time." Davis v. E. I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 257 F.
Supp. 729, 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
43 See cases cited note 39 supra.
44 257 F. Supp. 729 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
45 Id. at 732. See also Toksvig v. Bruce Publishing Co., 181 F.2d 664 (7th Cir. 1950);
Lewys v. O'Neil, 49 F.2d 603 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
46 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1914).
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private litigation, it does make the courts available to an injured party.
The beneficial effect this statute has had in protecting parties from
violation of the antitrust regulations is best illustrated by the results of
antitrust suits brought by the United States against private parties. In
actions brought by the federal government no allowance is permitted.
Because of the immense size of legal fees in bringing or defending an
antitrust litigation it is common practice for corporations to plead "no
contest" and pay the penalty to avoid the cost of litigation. In the private
sphere, prior to the regulations concerning attorney fees, one corporation
or person could bring such an action to harass, being reasonably confident
that a "no contest" plea would be entered and that actual litigation would
had
never be commenced. The overall effect is clear: the antitrust infringer
47
a green light because his victim could not afford to bring an action.
Unlike the Copyright Act, the Antitrust Act states that court costs
shall include a reasonable attorney fee; court discretion plays no part in
determining if the plaintiff will recover this cost. The unsuccessful
plaintiff in an antitrust action is not awarded his attorney's fee, except
in the "case of a derivative suit brought on behalf of a corporation, where
it is shown that the corporation has received substantial benefit." 48
The dollar amount to be awarded as attorney fees is solely within the
court's discretion, if reasonably exercised.4 9 In determining the amount of
this cost, the court looks to the following elements: the nature of the
question, its novelty and difficulty, the skill and competence of counsel, his
reputation in the community, amount involved, the result in relation to
the pleading, counsel experience and customary charges for similar
actions.50 The size of the attorney's fee awarded by the court is realistic
47

The primary purpose of Section 4 is to grant private parties the right to recover
treble damages for injuries to their property by reason of a violation of the
antitrust laws.... It was now so enlarged as to give much broader rights to a
private party injured so that such party would not only be more adequately
protected, but the law itself be in fact made more effective.

2 VON KALiNowsKi, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 11.04 & n.7 (1974).
482 VON KALNOWsKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REOULATIONS § 11.04(1) (1974).
See Schechtman v. Wolfson, 244 F.2d 537 (2d Cir. 1957).
The modem equity practice is to allow counsel fees to successful prosecutors of
derivative suits although no judgment has been obtained if they show substantial
benefit to the corporation through their effort. [Citing cases.] But there should be
some check on derivative actions lest they be purely strike suits of great nuisance
and no affirmative good, and hence it is ruled generally that the benefit to the
corporation and the general body of shareholders must be substantial.
244 F.2d at 540. See also Globus, Inc. v. Jaroff, 279 F. Supp. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
49 In South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 434 F.2d 767 (6th Cir. 1970),
the court awarded the plaintiff $2,410,452 in damages before tripling as required

by the Sherman Antitrust Act and Clayton Act. In answer to the defendant's
contention that the award of a $335,000 attorney's fee was unreasonable, the court
said: "A party seeking review of an award of attorney's fee in an antitrust case has
the burden of clearly demonstrating error in the factual basis of the award or an

abuse of discretion." 434 F.2d at 794.

50 Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 716-18
(N.D. Calif. 1962). See also Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478
(S D.N.Y. 1970); Farmingtop Dowel Produgts Co. v. Forster Mfg. Co., 297 F. Supp.
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and covers, in most instances, a large part of the actual legal cost. Usually,
the award is held to less than the actual damages awarded, before
tripling. An exception to this rule is in cases where the actual damages
are small. In such cases the court will award an attorney's fee that
is based on the above criteria, regardless of the fact that it amounts to
more than the actual damages. 51
The usual attorney fees awarded pursuant to the antitrust regulations
are large both in actual dollar amount and in percentage of trebled
damages. 52 As one would expect, as the damages awarded increase, the
53
reasonable attorney fees also increase, but at a slower percentage rate.
The net effect of the generous and realistic awards that reflect the
purchasing value of the dollar is that, in both the antitrust and copyright
areas of the law, the basic theory of the founding fathers is being
put into practice.
The concepts of poverty and expense are, among other factors,
relative to one's neighborhood, social position, and needs. A corporation
is poverty stricken in relation to the federal government; the lone novelist
is poor compared with a major motion picture corporation. Before the
copyright and antitrust regulations allowing reasonable attorney fees were
passed, victims of powerful violators were also the victims of legal
blackmail, strike actions and remediless violations that thrive under the
present system of torts and contracts.
Other FederalLegislation
The Copyright and Antitrust Regulations are not the only federal
924 (S.D. Me. 1969). In the exercise of its sound discretion the Farmington court
sustained an attorney's fee of $327,300 based on the following factors:

(1) whether plaintiff's counsel had the benefit of a prior judgment or decree in
a case brought by the Government; (2) the standing of counsel at the bar... ;
(3) time and labor spent by counsel; (4) the magnitude and complexity of the
litigation; (5) the responsibility undertaken by counsel; (6) the amount recovered;
and (7) the knowledge the court has of the conferences, the arguments that
were presented and the work shown by the record to have been done by the
attorneys for the plaintiff prior to trial.
297 F. Supp. at 925-26.
51 Advance Business Systems & Supply Co. v. S.C.M. Corp., 415 F.2d 55, 70 (4th Cir.
1969) (counsel fees $35,875, damages before trebling $16,714); Osborn v. Sinclair
Refining Co., 207 F. Supp. 856, 864 (D. Md. 1962) (single damages-325.00,

attorney fee allowed-$14,000, percentage of single damages-43%, percentage of
trebled damages-14.4%).
52For instance, in Twentieth Century Fox Film v. Goldwyn, 328 F.2d 190 (9th Cir.
1964), the court awarded trebled damages of $300,000, and $100,000 for attorneys'
fees, or 33.34%. See also Union Leader Corp. v. Newspapers of New England, Inc.,
218 F. Supp. 490 (D. Mass. 1963) (single damages-29,441.99, attorney fee allowed$68,000, percentage of single damages-235%, percentage of trebled damages-78%);

Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 312 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1970)

(single

damages-$45,870,478, attorney fee allowed-$7,500,000).
3For instance, in Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561, 587 (10th

Cir. 1961), where trebled damages were $4,400,000, and attorney fees were $500,000,

or only 11.36%.
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statutes providing for reasonable attorney fees. Without exhausting the list
of such statutes, the following acts parallel the Antitrust Regulations in
allowing a reasonable attorney's 'fee for the prevailing plaintiff: Fair Labor
Standard Act,54 Interstate Commerce Act,58 Railway Labor Act,56 Packers
and Stockyard Act,5 7 Merchant Marine Act,58 Communication Act, 9 and
the Tort-Claim Act.60 The Securities Act of 1933,61 like the Copyright
Act, allows either prevailing party a reasonable attorney's fee.
With the knowledge of the above federal statutes and the state
statutes to be discussed below, it becomes difficult to justify the argument
against allowing reasonable attorney fees in other areas of law. The
success of these statutes in providing remedies for all wrongs, regardless
of monetary amount, in making injured parties "whole," in eliminating or
decreasing abuse of the legal system and in clearing the court calendars
of actions that have no merit or that can be settled without court
5429 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1938): "The court in such action shall, in addition to any
judgment awarded to the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be
paid by the defendant..." (emphasis added).
The awarding of reasonable attorney's fees under the statute is made mandatory
by the replacement of "shall" for "may." Wright v. Carrigg, 275 F.2d 448 (4th Cir.
1960). See also Snelling v. O.K. Service Garage, Inc., 311 F. Supp. 842, 847 (ED.
Ky. 1970); Retail Store Employees Union v. Drug Fair-Community Drug Co., 307
F. Supp. 473, 480 (D.C. D.C. 1969); Foster v. Irwin, 258 F. Supp. 709, 712 (E.D.
La. 1966). The dollar amount of the mandatory attorney fee, however, remains in the
discretion of the court. Montalvo v. Tower Life Building, 426 F.2d 1135, 1149 (5th
Cir. 1970).
55 49 U.S.C. § 16 (1906): "If the plaintiff shall finally prevail he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as part of the cost of the suit."
5645 U.S.C. § 153 (1926): "If the petitioner shall finally prevail he shall be allowed
a reasonable attorney's fee, to be taxed and collected as a part of costs of the suit."
See United Transportation Union v. Soo Line Railroad Co., 457 F.2d 285, 288 (7th
Cir. 1972); Bangor & Aroostook Railroad Co. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen
& Engineers, 442 F.2d 812, 823 (D.C. 1971); Laday v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul
and Pacific Railroad Co., 299 F. Supp. 580, 582 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
577 U.S.C. § 210 (1921): "If the petitioner finally prevails, he shall be allowed a
reasonable attorney's fee to be taxed and collected as a part of the costs of the suit."
5846 U.S.C. § 1227 (1936): "Any person who shall be injured in his business or
property by reason of anything forbidden by this section... shall recover threefold
the damages
by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's
)
fee."

59 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1934):

In case any common carrier shall do, or cause or permit to be done, any act,
matter or thing in the chapter prohibited or declared to be unlawful... shall be
liable to the person.., injured thereby for the full amount of damages sustained
...together with a reasonable counsel or attorney's fee, to be fixed by the court
in every case of recovery....
6028 U.S.C. § 2678 (1948).
61 15 U.S.C. § 77(E) (1970):
In any suit under this or any other section of this subchapter, the court may, in
its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit,
including reasonable attorney's fees, if judgment shall be rendered against a
party litigant, upon the motion of the other party litigant, such costs may be
assessed in favor of such party litigation if the court believes the suit or the
defense to have been without merit, in an amount sufficient to reimburse him
for the reasonable expenses incurred by him.
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assistance, is evident by reading court opinions dealing with these
statutes. Why opponents of such legislation cling to their unsubstantiated
fears is a mystery. Those who maintain that such a cost system would not
work in civil cases of tort and contract are closing their eyes to the
English system and the statutes which reflect its success with mathematical
clarity. These opponents must also discount or explain away the success
that Alaska, Washington and Oregon have had with statutes similar
to the federal legislation.
STATE STATUTES

Alaska, Washington and Oregon all have statutes that grant attorney
fees to the prevailing party in a lawsuit. 62 These statutes, although not in
agreement with the present legislation of the original 13 colonies, do
offer, in fact, judicial protection to all citizens. The concept of reasonable
attorney fees, which is a matter of heated scholarly debate and of
questionable merit in the east, is commonplace in the courts of the
aforementioned western states. It is the authors' opinion that if we stop
talking and look to the practical results achieved by these three western
states and England, the answer will be self-evident. The three questions
that should be posed are: Does our system today offer the protection of
legal justice that the founding fathers described? Do Alaska, Washington,
Oregon and England offer such protection? What do these jurisdictions
have that we do not? The answer to the third rhetorical question is, of
course, in large part, that these jurisdictions include reasonable attorney
fees as part of court costs.
To illustrate, under the Alaska law in Varnell v. Swires,63 where an
employee-appellant sought judgment against his employer in the United
States District Court without pursuing his remedies under the local
workman's compensation law, a legal fee was awarded to the respondent
in the sum of $150.00. The case clearly followed the rule of McNeill &
Libby v. Alaska Industrial Board,64 where a $200.00 fee was similarly
allowed the prevailing party.
62

ALASKA STAT. § 09.60.010-.060 (1973). "Except as otherwise provided by statute the
Supreme Court shall determine by rule or order what costs, if any, including attorney
fees, shall be allowed the prevailing party in any case." Id. at § 09.60.010.
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.84.010-.020 (1962).
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors, shall be
left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties, but there shall be
allowed to the prevailing party upon judgment certain sums by way of
indemnity for his expenses in the action, which allowances are termed costs.
Id. at § 4.84.010.
ORE. REV. STAT. § 20.010 (1973):
The measure and mode of compensation of attorneys shall be left to the
argument, express or implied, of the parties, but there may be allowed to
the prevailing party in the judgment or decree certain sums by way of indemnity
for his attorney fees in maintaining the action or suit, or defense thereto, which
allowance are termed costs.
63261 F.2d 891 (9th Cir. 1958).
64 191 F.2d 260 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 913 (1952).
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In Jonas v. Bank of Kodiak,65 a dispute arose over whether travel
expenses were allowable to an attorney for a successful party under the
Alaska Statute. There was only one attorney then resident in Kodiak at
this time and he represented the unsuccessful plaintiff in the case. While
counsel fees of $500.00 were allowed the successful defendant, the
necessary travel expense was denied as outside the scope of the statute.
Under a pre-statehood Alaska rule, evidence need not be submitted
to the jury as to the reasonableness of an attorney's fee. The appellate
courts have found the local judge to be fully capable of66 determining
a reasonable fee without the need of testimony being taken.
Similarly, in Columbia Lumber Co. v. Agostino,6 7 the appellate court
refused to interfere with the trial court's discretion in awarding a $250.00
counsel fee to the successful party. The respondent had considered
it insufficient.
In the State of Washington, under a statutory rule, attorney's fees
are allowed only in modest specific amounts to the prevailing party other
than in cases which are recognized exceptions. 68 A more substantial grant
will be made where the matter of fees is covered by contract, a note, or
where litigation has been caused by a malicious third party.69 This section
limits fees to rather nominal amounts. While the principle is properly
established by the statute, we feel this minimal approach is not sufficient.
Oregon is similarly modest in its approach to the problem. Under the
statute7" and case law,71 a reasonable counsel fee to the prevailing party
is permitted in cases where the amount in controversy is less than
$1,000.00, and a demand has been made for the same at least 10 days
before suit was instituted.
It should be said that these three states are not the only jurisdictions
allowing such costs. New York, for example, has granted a certain class
of persons under limited circumstances such costs in Section 64 of the
General Corporation Law. 72 It should be noted that this statute more
65166 F. Supp. 739 (D.C. Alaska 1958).
66
See Forno v. Coyle, 75 F.2d 692 (9th Cir. 1935).
67 184 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1950).
68 WASH. REv. CODE § 4.84.060 (1962).
69 See Vincent v. Parkland Light & Power, 5 Wis. App. 684; 491 P.2d 692 (1971);

Armstrong Construction Co. v. Thompson, 64 Wis. 2d 191, 390 P.2d 976 (1964).
70

ORE. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (1973).

71 See Hollopeter v. Oregon Mutual Insurance Co., 225 Ore. 73, 464 P.2d 316 (1970);
Draper v. Mullenex, 220 Ore. 1, 357 P.2d 519 (1960).
72 N.Y. GEN. CORP. § 64 (McKinney Supp. 1972):

Any person made a party to any action, suit or proceeding by reason of the fact
that he, his testator or intestate, is or was a director, officer or employee of a
corporation shall be entitled to have his reasonable expenses, incurred by him in
connection with the defense of such action, suit or proceeding, and in connection
with any appeal therein, assessed against the corporation or against another

corporation at the request of which he served as such director, officer or
employee, upon court order...
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closely follows the English system of solicitor and barrister taxation than
its American counterpart. The New York General Corporation Law says
"actually and necessarily," not "reasonable." It has been shown that
"reasonable costs" have been liberally construed by courts based on time
involved, skill employed and other subjective criteria, while the British
courts, although also rendering large allowances at times, look more to
basic necessities. The English system thus interpreted and employed in
the New York General Corporation Law is an excellent compromise
between the two systems that could reap all the benefits outlined above
and still be more acceptable to opponents of such legislation.
In New York, in limited classes of exceptional cases, counsel fees
may also be imposed on the unsuccessful party. These would include
instances where a contract sued upon specifies the obligation to pay
counsel fees as a matter of right. Actually, the recovery if allowed, is upon
the contract and not a matter of costs. Similarly, where there is fraud
or malice or where a party is obliged to litigate with a third person due to
defendant's bad faith, legal fees may be allowed.
In the case of Chatham Nameplate Inc. v. Pleffer,Th the Supreme
Court of Queens County allowed counsel fees to the plaintiff where the
defendant had forced the plaintiff to litigate with a controlled corporation
while diluting its assets to himself. The court found fraud and bad faith
on the defendant's part, as well, and felt that the case fitted within "the
recognized exception to the rule that attorney fees incurred in litigating
74
a claim are not recoverable as an item of damage.
As an alternative theory, the court 'found a right to assess counsel
fees as part of "punitive damages" for wanton conduct. By this test, as
well, the defendant was found responsible.
Where an attachment against a defendant's property has been
improperly issued and is set aside, counsel fees in securing the vacatur
may also be recovered. 75
The approach of these decisions is not the approach that your authors
submit for your consideration. There should be no requirement of fraud
or bad faith before an allowance of fees is permitted. But these cases do
refute the argument made by our opponents that the courts cannot
responsibly set fair compensation to prevailing counsel and that to impose
such a duty would overwhelm the judiciary.
We suggest, for your consideration, a proposed state statute to
read as follows:
Any court of record with appropriate jurisdiction of any action or
proceeding is hereby authorized and directed, effective
168 N.Y.L.J. No. 13, at 10, July 20, 1972.
See Russian Church v. Dunkel, 67 Misc. 2d 1032, 326 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1971).
75A. C. Israel Co. v. Banco de Brasil, 50 Misc. 2d 362, 270 N.Y.S.2d 283 (1966).
73
74
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197-, to order payment to the prevailing party or parties in said
action or proceeding pending before it, upon the entry of any order
or judgment therein, of counsel fees in a sum to be determined in
the court's reasonable discretion, as well as costs and disbursements
as provided by law. Such fees may be determined by the court on
stipulation of the parties or otherwise by the court, or if found
necessary, referred to a referee for hearing and report. Where the
matter of such counsel fees is contested, it shall be determined with
a view to such criteria as results achieved, time expended, novelty of
legal problems involved, experience of counsel, public benefit and
other relevant factors. No such listing of criteria is to be regarded as
exclusive. While the matter of good faith of the nonprevailing party
in instituting such action or proceeding may be considered as relevant
as to the size of any such counsel fee so awarded, a finding of such
good faith shall not in itself bar or limit the granting of reasonable
counsel fees to the prevailing party or parties. Provided, however,
that in the event that the court finds that the action or proceeding
brought or defenses asserted, were frivolous in nature or for damages
in excess of any reasonable demand or otherwise unjustified, then
and in such event the court shall have the discretion to deny counsel
fees to the prevailing party or parties in part or in toto.
CONCLUSION

There are a host of other examples authorizing the granting of fees
to the prevailing parties. These fees have been administered without huge
windfalls to lawyers or anyone else. Judicial techniques can easily be
utilized to meet this problem. They have overcome far more serious
difficulties in legal administration.
Logic, fairness and equity now clearly require discretion in our courts
to permit the granting of a counsel fee to a prevailing party where
litigation has been instituted. The precise manner to accomplish this
purpose and the methods and techniques to be utilized should be fully and
promptly investigated. While there are problems to be dealt with, the
principle should be quickly established which will allow damaged parties
the assurance of reasonable indemnity. The legal profession, society and
justice would be the beneficiaries. Counsel fees should be considered as
the direct and proximate result of the damages litigated. The victim of a
wrong should not be forced to weigh the cost of attaining justice against
the cost of putting the judicial machinery into operation.
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